BYU Law Review
Volume 2011 | Issue 3

Article 8

9-1-2011

Coalition and Hegemony: Religion's Role in the
Progress of Modernization in Reformed China
Zeng Chuanhui

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the
Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Zeng Chuanhui, Coalition and Hegemony: Religion's Role in the Progress of Modernization in Reformed China, 2011 BYU L. Rev. 759
(2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2011/iss3/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

DO NOT DELETE

1/31/2013 3:49 PM

Coalition and Hegemony: Religion’s Role in the Progress
of Modernization in Reformed China
Zeng Chuanhui



I. INTRODUCTION
In the past thirty-two years, mainland China has risen from one of
the poorest countries to the second largest economic power in the world.1
The sweeping but stable progress of modernization in China may be
listed among the most important events in human history.2 What are the
proper cultural factors contributing to this marvel? What is the role of
religion in this progress?
According to Max Weber, the Protestant ethic was coincident with
3
the rise of capitalism in Europe. Protestantism is obviously irrelevant to
the situation in China because Protestants are still a very small minority
to this day,4 and Calvinistic ethic has little influence there.
During the 1970s and 80s when “the four little dragons in East
Asia”—Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea—took the lead in
modernization in Asia, many Neo-Confucian scholars ascribed the great
success to Confucian morality, which still somewhat influences the
cultural mores of these countries. China was the cradle of Confucianism
and, of course, has been traditionally regarded as the major enclave of
Confucian culture. Nevertheless, Confucianism has been criticized and
rejected by mainstream intellectuals as an opponent to modernity since

. Associate Professor and Department Chair, Department of Marxist Theories on Religion,
Institute of World Religions, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).
1. James Altucher, There’s No Stopping China, NEW YORK POST, Aug. 1, 2010,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/there_no_stopping_china_0H8GJaMgzHCYenL038Yh2N.
2. SUISHENG ZHAO, CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: PRAGMATISM AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
248 (2004).
3. See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM
(Talcott Parsons trans., Dover Publ’ns 2003) (1958).
4. According to the census data conducted by our institute, in 2009 about 1.8% of the
population in mainland China declared themselves as Protestants. See also Anthony Lam, A Review
of the Development of Christianity in China from the Latest Edition of Blue Book of Religions
(2010), 159 TRIPOD 54 (2010) (“In China, Protestants make up about 1.8 percent of the total
population.” (citing THE CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, BLUE BOOK OF RELIGIONS 191
(2010))).
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the May Fourth Movement in 1919.5 After the Chinese Communist Party
(“CCP”) came into power in 1949, and especially during the Cultural
Revolution, Confucianism was treated as one of the “putrescent” cultures
that should be thrown away “into the trash pile of history.”6 In the past
several years, conditions have changed only slightly, but the government
and some intellectuals are trying to make use of Confucian morality to
help rebuild social order. The voices of neo-Confucianism are just
beginning to echo from the studies of scholars.
Are the above observations sufficient for us to conclude that religion
has been basically absent from the modernization of reformed China?
How can we properly evaluate the role of religion in that country? This
Article briefly examines these questions. Part II discusses China’s system
of elite governance and how it has become more open to religion. Part III
examines religion’s influence on China’s developing culture. Finally,
Part IV discusses sources of domestic and foreign resistance to China’s
changing hegemony.
II. RELIGION PLAYS A PART IN THE ELITE COALITION
A. The Elitist Governance
The Chinese government claims that China is a socialist country, but
its version of socialism is fundamentally different from the traditional
sense in that (1) it totally embraces the market economy, which was
purported to be one of the lethal factors of capitalism; (2) most of the
state-owned enterprises have been privatized; and (3) the disparity in the
distribution of wealth in China today is among the greatest in the world.7
5. See KAI-WING CHOW, BEYOND THE MAY FOURTH PARADIGM: IN SEARCH OF CHINESE
MODERNITY 162 (2008).
6. See WILLIAM THEODORE DE BARY & WEI-MING TU, CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 253 (1998). There were many popular slogans during the Cultural Revolution, such as
“Demolish the Four Olds,” which referred to the old thinking, old culture, old customs and old
habits, and “Sweep all the putrescent feudalist, capitalist and revisionist contrabands into the trash
pile of history with the iron besom of proletariat.” “The feudalist contrabands” refers particularly to
the cultures from China itself before the ruling of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); “the
capitalist contrabands” refers to those from the western countries; and the “revisionist contrabands”
refers to those from the Soviet Union. See also Editorial, Sweep Up
All Kinds of Ox Monsters and Snake Demons（横扫一切牛鬼蛇神), PEOPLE’S DAILY, June 1, 1966
(later labeled as the “Declaration of the Cultural Revolution”); Red Guards from the Middle School
Attached to Tsinghua University, Long Live the Revolutionary Rebelling Spirit of the Proletariat
(无产阶级的革命造反精神万岁), 37 PEKING REVIEW 20, 20–21, Sept. 9, 1966, available at
http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/1966/PR1966-37p.htm
(commended
by
Chairman Mao, published in Red Flag Journal, and labeled the “Declaration of Red Guards”).
7. BJÖRN GUSTAFSSON, SHI LI & TERRY SICULAR, INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY IN
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According to traditional Marxism, public ownership and distribution of
goods in proportion to work are two basic standards of socialism.8 In
today’s China, state ownership and collective ownership have been
transformed in favor of joint-stock ownership.9 Social wealth has
become more and more concentrated in the holdings of a small
percentage of the population. In 2008, the Gini coefficient was around
.469,10 approaching an alarming level.
Thus China no longer has a socialist system, at least in the traditional
sense. Nor does it have a capitalist system. The major difference between
the system of China and that of other Western capitalist countries is the
system of governance. The Chinese people have not voted to select their
president directly. This does not mean that there is no democracy at all,
or
that
the
Chinese
government
lacks legitimacy. China’s special way of governance and the
government’s high efficiency have supported its legitimacy.
Some scholars of politics named this system of governance “neo-

CHINA 118–144 (2008).
8. See generally ADRIAN CHAN, CHINESE MARXISM (2003).
9. The ownership reform of state corporations started in the mid-1990s. The state
corporations have been reorganized as limited or joint-stock companies. The methods of reform are
diverse and include combination, annexation, leasing, responsibility contract, alienation, bankruptcy,
and, of course, joint-stock. The reform proposals are made or approved by the parent units who
control the ownership. The goal of reform is to establish the modern company system, which allows
the executive agency independence in day-to-day decision making involving production, hiring, and
contracts with other businesses. In most cases, the management of the reformed companies evolved
to become the major stockholders. By 2005, most state corporations were privatized. For example, in
the three provinces in Northeast China (Manchuria) where state corporations used to flourish, 62.5%
of large industrial corporations were reformed, and in Liaoning Province, state ownership fell below
50%. All province or county-controlled ownerships were transformed in Jilin Province, including the
carving up of 90% of 3,000 midsized and small state corporations and 85% of the large corporations.
As a result, a significant number of private companies are formerly state-owned. In a sample test
conducted in 2002, 25.7% of private companies used to be state-owned or collectively owned all
around China. In East China, this figure is even higher, up to 45.6%. See Report by Gao Liang,
Director of the Center for State-Owned Property Under the National Development and Reform
Commission,
SCIENCE
NETWORK
(Nov.
20,
2007,
10:49
AM),
http://bbs.sciencenet.cn/home.php?mod=space&uid=2862&do=blog&id=11346; see also George
Tseo et al., The Reform of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Through Employee Ownership of
Stock and Participation in Management 1–2 (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://cog.kent.edu/lib/TseoPeng-zhuLihai.pdf.
10. ROGER A. ARNOLD, ECONOMICS 578 (2005). The Gini coefficient is a measure of
inequality of a distribution developed by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini in 1912. It is often used
to measure income inequality. It is a number between zero and one, where zero corresponds to
perfect equality (e.g. everyone has the same income) and one corresponds to perfect inequality (e.g.
one person has all the income and everyone else has zero income).
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authoritarianism,” which was quite popular in the 1980s through the
early 1990s.11 As to rampant corruption, some scholars called it crony
capitalism, but I prefer to characterize it as elite governance. I do not
adopt the term “elitism” because it has multivocal and derogatory
meanings. The elite governance I refer to in this Article is the style of
political practice in reformed China, which implies that the government
rules with the cooperation of select groups whose members can claim
great achievements, widespread social influence, or a high level of
specialized training. The gist of elite governance in the Chinese context
is often expressed as a popular slogan: “Experts manage state affairs”
(Zhuan jia zhi guo).12 Accordingly, most of the “third generation leading
group”13 headed by Jiang Zemin and the “Hu-Wen leading group”14 had
technocratic backgrounds. This occurred partly because technocrats are
better at accumulating good performances and hence get promoted faster
in an economy-centered era.15 It was also partly an intentional selection
because Deng Xiaoping, the leader of the CCP, and his think tank
adopted a strategy of technocracy.16 This strategy successfully avoided
11. In the early period of reform, Chinese people were concentrated on the disenchantment
from the deified leadership of Chairman Mao, but soon after the nation became ideologically
confused. The expansive power of local governments presented a significant challenge to the
authority of the central government. In fact, some intellectuals and high officials were eager to
introduce radical political reform, which resulted in more social turmoil. These intellectuals and
officials included Fang Lizhi (方励之), former professor and president of the University of Science
and Technology of China, Yan Jiaqi (严家其), former professor and director of the Institute of
Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Hu Yaobang, the former sectary-general of the
CCP. In response, Mr. Deng Xiaoping repeatedly stressed authority. He drew a new road map:
strong authority of the ruling party, where the CCP and leading groups would secure social order,
make government efficient, and cushion market-oriented, economical reform. Some scholars, like
Xiao Gongqin (萧功秦), professor at Shanghai Jiaotong University, Wu Jiaxiang (吴稼样), then a
staff member of the Central Committee’s Research Department and now a freelance writer, and
Zhang Binjiu (张炳九), professor at Peking University, adapted the neo-authoritarian theory to this
situation.
See
AN
INTRODUCTION
TO
NEO-AUTHORITARIANISM,
http://baike.baidu.com/view/2290869.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2011); see also TAKASHI INOGUCHI &
MATTHEW CARLSON, GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY IN ASIA 144 (2006).
12. ZHIDONG HAO, INTELLECTUALS AT A CROSSROADS 227 (2003).
13. This phrase refers to the generation of party leaders during current President Hu Jintao’s
presidency.
14. See JOHN WONG & HONGYI LAI, CHINA INTO THE HU-WEN ERA: POLICY INITIATIVES
AND CHALLENGES 7 (2006).
15. Id.
16. Kaiser Kuo, Made in China: The Revenge of the Nerds, TIME, June 27, 2001,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,165453,00.html. This strategy of selecting leaders
with science and technology backgrounds results in a different leadership dynamic than that of many
Western countries such as the United States, where most political leaders have legal or social science
backgrounds.
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the waste caused by rifts between the leftist vis-à-vis rightist ideologies
and cushioned the implementation of pragmatism. The technocracy, with
the cooperation of elites from other circles, formed a distinctive elite
governance.
Elite governance differs from neo-authoritarianism in that it accepts
low political involvement from the grass roots but does not exclude
them.17 It lurches, though cautiously, towards universal suffrage; it is not
tantamount to cronyism in that it demonstrates strong will, tries to
determine the best way to fight against corruption and disparity, and
allows vertical social mobility.
After the Tiananmen Square Movement in 1989, the Chinese
government launched a nationwide reindoctrination and rectification
movement to reestablish its authority on the one hand, and insisted on the
implementation of reform strategies on the other.18 The policies, most of
which had been designed by the former leading group stagnated under
the radical movement in 1989 but were realized under the powerful
endorsement and resuscitation of the late paramount leader Deng
Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in the early spring of 1992.19 The governing
Party has addressed the economic interests of the business elites by
adopting a joint-stock system and has focused on shared ideology and
decision making with the intellectual elites.20 There is also more
separation among the various functions of party, government, business,
and education. Other improvements include a more independent
judiciary system and a more professional civil service.21 It is true that the
Party today still controls the appointment of top officials at every level,
and top officials hold concurrent posts of both party and administration
in many cases, but the Party and the government are far less involved in
day-to-day management (except, of course, in sensitive political areas).
Experiments with the election of village leaders by universal voting have
been extended throughout the countryside.22 In some places, elections to

17. See generally INOGUCHI & CARLSON, supra note 11.
18. See generally YIJIANG DING, CHINESE DEMOCRACY AFTER TIANANMEN (2001).
19. JAMES A. R. MILES, THE LEGACY OF TIANANMEN: CHINA IN DISARRAY 88 (1997).
Following the Tiananmen Square Movement, Deng Xiaoping toured several southern provinces to
encourage continued economic reform but not political reform.
20. See generally JUAN ANTONIO FERNÁNDEZ & LEILA FERNÁNDEZ-STEMBRIDGE, CHINA’S
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS: AN INDUSTRIAL AND CEO APPROACH (2007).
21. See generally Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China’s Judicial Reform,
4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 255 (2003).
22. Dingjian Cai, The Development of Constitutionalism in the Transition of Chinese Society,
19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 18–19 (2005).
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local legislatures have become more democratic, allowing independent
candidates.23 In 2002, the Party revised its charter in order to reflect the
growth of a new bourgeoisie and allowed private entrepreneurs to join
the Party. And the Party has recently encouraged greater public
involvement in the drafting of some local legislation by holding open
hearings.24 It was reported that more than 5,000 experts from all walks of
life participated in the drafting of The Eleventh Five-Year Plan, which
was passed by the national congress in June 2006.25
B. The Return and Development of the United Front Policy
In 1978, with the ascension of Deng Xiaoping to power and the
introduction of a profound reform program, party leaders also reached a
consensus that they must shift the role of the party from revolution to
governing and bring back the United Front policy—the coalition
strategy.26 In October 1978, the Central Committee issued a document to
“address two emergent questions on religious work,” which were (1) to
“distinguish the two contradictions with different natures”27 and
“earnestly and roundly implement the constitution’s article dealing with
the freedom of religious belief,” and (2) to return a few venues for open
worship.28 This document initiated a journey to bring religious
organizations into the new coalition. In the next year, the Central
Committee once again approved its United Front Work Department’s
(UFWD) request for abolishing the “hat of capitulationism”29 put on the
23. Id.
24. See Richard J. Ferris Jr. & Hongjun Zhang, The Challenges of Reforming an
Environmental Legal Culture: Assessing the Status Quo and Looking at Post-WTO Admission
Challenges for the People’s Republic of China, 14 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 429, 445–46 (2002).
25. For reports on the independent legislature candidates, which captured much public
attention, see Shenzhen Futian District People’s Congress General Elections, CHINA YOUTH (May
21, 2003, 2:25 AM), http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2003-05/21/content_ 666412.htm. Some earlier
independent cases occurred even in the 1980s and 1990s, but few people paid attention to them. See
Shenzhen’s Wang Liang is Not the “First Independent Candidate,” CLUB.KDNET.Net (May 26,
2003, 8:59 AM), http://club.kdnet.net/ dispbbs.asp?boardid=2&id=597224&page=1#597224.
26. See George Finch, Modern Chinese Constitutionalism: Reflections of Economic Change,
15 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 75, 92–93 (2007).
27. This refers to the sometimes inconsistent characteristics of religion.
28. In October 1978, the Central Committee of the CCP forwarded a report from the Central
United Front Work Department of the CCP. The name of the report was Urgent Need to Address
Two Current Religious Policy-Related Issues. This file is one of the files possessed by the Central
United Front Work Department of the CCP.
29. “Capitulationism,” from the word “capitulant,” refers to thoughts or behaviors that harm
national or class interests and surrender to the enemy or another country. The “hat” here is actually
the abbreviated name for a “clown’s long hat,” which was a tall conical paper hat filled with large
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heads of the organs of the united front, ethnic and religious work during
the Cultural Revolution throughout the country.30 This actually was a
formal top-down purge, which was part of the new coalition strategy.
This purge cleared the way for religious participation in public life.
Nevertheless, the new coalition strategy encountered much resistance
from the “leftists” in the early post-Maoist era, which required a more
sophisticated ideological justification. In September 1979, Deng
Xiaoping gave an order to legalize ethnic and religious policies.31 In the
coming years, Hu Yaobang, the late general secretary of the CCP,
presided personally over attempts to articulate a new set of policies
acceptable to all the political viewpoints in that period. In March 1982,
the Central Committee issued the well-known Document 19,32 which
today is still the working guideline and theoretical foundation for the
CCP in dealing with religious affairs.33 It highlighted from a Marxist
viewpoint that religion is a historical-social phenomenon, meaning that
religion is not only a kind of ideology but also an important social force,
and has a natural process of origination, development, and death.34 It
stressed the five characteristics of religion—longevity, popularity, ethnic
diversity, international appeal, and complex nature—which were
articulated in the 1950s by Li Weihan, a late director of central UFWD.35
These five characteristics were later reduced to the three
characteristics—longevity, popularity and complex nature—in 2002 by
Ye Xiaowen, the present director of the State Administration of
Religious Affairs (SARA).36 This theoretical formulation led to the
conclusion that the freedom of religious practice should not be a policy
characters spouting insulting labels and put on the head of a “bad element” at a denunciation
conference during the Cultural Revolution. In the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards put the label
of capitulationism（投降主义） on the United Front Work and stopped it.
30. In 1979, a report filed by the Central United Front Work Department of the Chinese
Communist Party was approved. The name of the report was A Request for Abolishing the Hat of
Capitulationism of All United Front, Ethnic, and Religious Work Through the Country.
31. DENG XIAOPING’S COMMENTS ON UNITED FRONT WORK 161 (1991).
32. In 1982, the Central Committee of CCP published Document Number 19. The name of
the document was The Basic Opinion and Policy of Religious Issues During the Period of Socialism
in China. An English translation can be found in DONALD E. MACINNIS, RELIGION IN CHINA
TODAY: POLICY AND PRACTICE 8-26 (1989).
33. See Lawrence Cox, Freedom of Religion in China: Religious, Economic and Social
Disenfranchisement for China’s Internal Migrant Workers, 8 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 370, 374
(2007).
34. Id.
35. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, CHINA: STATE CONTROL OF RELIGION 117 (1997).
36. Ye Xiaowen, Socialist Religions, 5 QIU SHI (求是) (2003), available at
http://www.dingan.gov.cn/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=954.

765

DO NOT DELETE

1/31/2013 3:49 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2011

of expedience but must be guided and supervised under laws and
regulations.
When the third generation leading group came to power in 1992,
some subtle changes had taken place in the religious situation in China:
most religious properties that could be returned had been handed over to
the respective religious organizations, the focus of religious affairs had
switched to daily coordination and supervision, the religious “boom”
enabled temples and churches to play a larger role in society, the former
socialist countries had imploded, China had entered the WTO, and China
was more deeply involved in globalization. All of these developments
ushered in a whole new range of challenges.37 In November 1993,
President Jiang Zemin’s address at the National United Front Work
Conference38 updated the CCP’s views. The address was later condensed
into the “four phrases,” the last of which was appended to Jiang Zemin’s
report at the Sixteenth Party Congress held in November 2002.39 The
four phases are: (1) implement the Party’s religious policy thoroughly;
(2) administer the religious affairs according to the law; (3) positively
guide the mutual adaptation between religion and socialist society; and
(4) insist on the principle of independence and self-administration.40
C. Religious Organizations’ Involvement in the Elite Coalition
With the implementation of the new policies, all of the five major
religions—Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism—
have enjoyed three decades of growth and have multiplied their
memberships and properties.41 According to the government’s
incomplete statistics, in 2004 there were over 100 million religious

37. See generally, Kim-Kwong Chan, China’s Socioeconomic Changes and the Implications
for the Religion-State Dynamic in China, 2004 BYU L. REV. 325.
38. The reliable full text of the document can be found on some government websites.
39. Jiang Zemin, Build a Well-Off Society in an All-Round Way and Create a New Situation
in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (Nov. 8, 2002), http://www.chinaun.ch/eng/ljzg/smwx/t85795.htm (unofficial English version of the report delivered at the 16th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China).
40. Id. at V.1. The Chinese text of the four phases is: “全面贯彻党的宗教信仰自由政 策,
依法管理宗教事务, 积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应, 坚持独立自主自办的原则.”
41. Cf. Chan, supra note 37, at 334–35 (“The growth in religion includes the officially
sanctioned faiths, such as Christianity and Buddhism, as well as . . . unsanctioned religious sects
. . . .”); Ian Johnson, The Rise of the Tao, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/magazine/07religion-t.html?pagewanted=all# (“It is impossible
to miss the religious building boom, with churches, temples and mosques dotting areas where none
existed a few years ago.”).
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followers,42 more than 110,000 religious venues, some 330,000 religious
personnel, and at least 74 religious schools throughout China. This
included 8 million laypersons, 4,000 clergy, and over 4,600 venues
affiliated with Catholicism. Over 16 million lay persons, some 18,000
clergy, and 37,000 churches and temporary venues belonged to
Protestant religions. Since the 1980s, approximately 600 Protestant
churches have been reopened or newly organized each year in China;
through 1995 to 2004, the annual increase rate of Protestants was above
5%.43 In 2009, the Institute of World Religions conducted a large-scale
sampling of 63,680 questionnaires from 2,718 villages and communities
in 321 counties. The results indicate that there are 23 million Protestants
in China.44
This religious “boom” cost all levels of government substantial
energy and money to vacate occupants from temples and churches and
transplant residences for planned new religious buildings. The
government also provided subsidies to repair and maintain the old
religious buildings that were declared cultural relics. In 2002, for
example, the central government appropriated 330 million yuan ($46
million) for the second-stage rehabilitation of the three famous ancient
lamasery compounds in Tibet (Potala, Norbuglinkha, and Sagya). These
repairs were actually completed seven years later at a much higher price
of 380 million yuan.45 In some cases the government also reimbursed
needy religious organizations for operating expenses. This financial

42. Johnson, supra note 41 (noting that previous surveys showed 100 million religious
followers and more recent surveys suggest there are around 300 million religious followers).
43. These data came from the Central UFWD’s statistics in 2004. The annual increase rate is
calculated by the author. The statistics are collected down-up through the governmental hierarchy
and are restricted to a very small circle without public availability. Nevertheless, a slightly earlier
version of similar numbers was announced in October 1997 in the bilingual white paper Freedom of
Religious Belief in China, available at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/zjxy/t36492.htm.
According to SARA, the Protestant believers numbered 10.57 million in 1995, and 16 million by the
end of 2003. The equation is: 10.57×（1+x）8=16 (million). The resolution is 0.532. Thus, the
annual rate is above 5%.
44. RELIGION BLUE BOOK: CHINESE RELIGION REPORT (2010) 190–212 (Jin Ze & Qiu
Yonghui eds., 2011); see also Survey: Over 23 Million Christians in China, 9 CHINA LINKS NEWSL.
46 (Aug.–Sept. 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/euraxess/links/china/docs/ aug_sept_2010.pdf.
45. Potala Palace, Norbulingka and Sakya Monastery Maintenance Works Started for Three
Key
Cultural
Relics
Protection,
CCTV.COM
(June
26,
2002,
8:34
PM)
http://www.cctv.com/news/xwlb/20020626/345.html; Potala Palace, Norbulingka and Sakya
Monastery Maintenance Works Completed Three Major Cultural Relics, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY
(Aug. 23, 2009, 10:47 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-08/23/content_11932451.htm;
see
also
Jing
Xiaolei,
Investing
in
Tibet’s
Culture,
BEIJING
REV.,
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/200805/04/content_114130.htm (last updated May 4, 2008).
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support enables religions to share in public prosperity and greatly
consolidates the foundation of the elite coalition.
There are some conduits for religions to share power, ideas, and
honor with public authorities. Religious personalities, having recovered
from the injustices they suffered during the Cultural Revolution, became
saint-like figures in their respective religions. As a result, thousands of
younger persons have graduated from religious schools and become
clergy, and many religious students who studied abroad have come back
to serve their flocks.46 Thousands of these religious leaders have
ascended to be members of the gradually expanding elite coalition, the
major organizations of which are the congresses, political consultant
committees, and youth leagues at the national, provincial, municipal, and
county levels. This provides an active and efficient way to represent the
voices
of
the
believers
and
provides them a way to participate in the decision making, supervision,
and policy-improving processes.
These coalition members are selected rather than elected. The
selection procedure is confusing to outsiders and varies by zone,
organization, and time period. The general pattern seems to be that the
inner circle of one religious organization determines and submits the
candidates to the related government and party organs—religious affairs
bureaus, United Front Work Departments, congresses, or committees—
for approval. Although the public opinion and reputations of the
candidates are important variables for consideration, recognition within
the elite groups plays a more direct role in the selection process.
III. THE ADAPTATION AND CONTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS CULTURE TO
THE GESTATING CULTURAL HEGEMONY
A. Challenges that Have Prompted Remolding the Cultural Hegemony
There are certainly cultural factors behind Chinese success. Unlike
European countries, North America, and “the four little dragons in East

46. The national statistics of graduates from the religious schools are not accessible, but some
local governments have published their numbers. For example, the five religious schools in Shanghai
Municipality have trained more than 1,000 graduates since the 1980s. Details are available at the
Shanghai government website: http://www.shmzw.gov.cn/gb/mzw/shzj/ zjyx/index.html. See also
INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, FREEDOM OF
RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN CHINA, at IV (Oct. 1997), available at http://sa.chinaembassy.org/eng/zt/zfbps/t154430.htm.
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Asia,” modern China has no dominant religious culture. The functioning
cultural elements that have facilitated the fast growth of the reform era
are the harmonious cultural bonds, which are a product of China’s long
history. The people share a common national language, ethnopsychology, and customs. No religious background can be found in the
existent political system. Laws may be incomplete but are quite simple
and practical. The governing party sticks to Marxism as its leading
ideology, and keeps honing new discourses and propagating new ideas to
shape the national mindset. Therefore, it is easy for the government to
reach agreement, and the execution of new ideas encounters low
resistance.
This way of governance successfully holds mainland China in a
monolithic configuration, but the legitimacy of the dominant ideology
has faced great challenges in the post-Cold War years; tension between
the ideal and social reality is becoming ever more salient. When
confronted with sensitive questions, such as the yawning disparity
between the rich and poor, human rights, democracy, freedom, and
openness,
the
government
often
has
no

consistent theories with which to defend itself, regardless of whether the
charges come from home or abroad.47
The post-Cold War global situation has also given the Chinese elite a
tug. While the vocal discussions on Samuel Huntington’s theory on the
conflicts of civilizations rippled through the nation,48 the Kosovo and
Iraq Wars, the September 11, 2001 incident, and the Color Revolutions
in the former Soviet Union states made the Chinese elite think more
deeply on how culture matters, even though they might not agree with
Huntington’s conclusions.
B. Antonio Gramsci’s Theory of Cultural Hegemony
In 1992, Selected Writings by Gramsci was translated by the Central
Compilation and Translation Bureau and published by Renmin Press.49
Antonio Gramsci was a founder of the Communist movement in Italy.
47. See Bryan Edelman & James T. Richardson, Falun Gong and the Law: Development of
Legal Social Control in China, 6 NOVA RELIGIO: J. ALTERNATIVE & EMERGENT RELIGIONS 312,
326–27 (2003).
48. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1993).
49. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTED WRITINGS (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau
trans., Renmin Press 1992).
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He spent a lot of energy discussing issues affecting Marxist theory in his
Prison Notebooks after the worldwide economic depression of the early
1930s, when Marxism failed to materialize in the most advanced
capitalist nations.50 Although Marxism did not become widespread, it
was not defeated either. Capitalist governments managed to survive the
economic and political crisis and stabilize themselves by making
socialist compromises and transformations. This situation created the
need for new theories to explain the extraordinary resilience of
capitalism and for new strategies different from those that had worked in
Russia. Gramsci’s theory was developed in opposition to Idealist
philosophers, represented by Benedetto Croce,51 and to the mechanist
materialists, represented by Karl Kautsky,52 as well as other theorists of
the Second International.53 Gramsci opposed Kautsky’s idea of political
inactivity, which proposed that the lower classes wait passively for the
“objective moment” when the crises of capitalism produces system
collapse, but he agreed with Lenin and Luxemburg that class struggle
could create conditions for socialist revolution. He especially
emphasized cultural struggle, which resembles Croceanism to some
degree.54 To develop this cultural struggle, he put the concept of cultural
hegemony at the center of his vast and loose network of ideas.
What is most interesting to contemporary Chinese intellectuals is
Gramsci’s departure from the definition of hegemony, which was widely
accepted to be a strategy of political leadership that was based upon a

50. See ANTONIO GRAMSCI, Americanism and Fordism, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON
NOTEBOOKS 277 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., trans., 1971).
51. Widely regarded as the “foremost Italian philosopher of the first half of the 20th
century,” Croce thoroughly studied and eventually rejected Marxism before founding La Critica, “a
journal of cultural criticism, in which . . . he published nearly all his writings and reviewed all of the
most important historical, philosophical, and literary work that was being produced in Europe at the
time.”
A.
Robert
Caponigri,
Benedetto
Croce,
BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/143635/Benedetto-Croce# (last visited Sept. 4, 2011).
52. A leading Marxist theorist during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
Kautsky’s writings made him “largely responsible for Marxism’s early spread.” Kautsky, Karl,
ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Karl_Johann_Kautsky.aspx (last visited
Sept. 4, 2011). For Kautsky’s view on materialism, see KARL KAUTSKY, ETHICS AND THE
MATERIALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY (John B. Askew trans., 1906), available at
http://snap3.uas.mx/RECURSO1/pensamiento%20economico/LECTURAS%20HISTORIA%20DEL
%20PENSAMIENTO%20ECON%E0MICO.%20INGL%90S/Kautsky.%20Ethics%20and%20the%
20Materialist%20Conception%20of%20History.pdf.
53. See GRAMSCI, supra note 50, at 343 n.28.
54. Id. at xxiii (noting that Gramsci critiqued Crocean philosophy’s reduction of the “struggle
of opposites to a merely conceptual dialectic” because it inadequately addressed the “real conflicts”
inherent in a class society).
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fundamental alliance with the peasantry (Lenin and Mao). He articulated
that it is not the economic foundation that determines power structure
directly, but rather cultural hegemony. His version of Marxism
repudiates linear and mechanistic thinking, which reduces culture and
ideas, including religion, to direct, passive reflections of economic
forces. He views culture as a semiautonomous sphere of society that
plays an important mediating role in the totality of social life. Revolution
struggle, for Gramsci, is ultimately a matter of education. Education in
Italy at that time was still a rigidly bourgeois affair. In his view, the
lower classes must generate their own “organic intellectuals”55 capable
of creating new forms of hegemony by shattering the universalistic
claims of old worldviews. These organic intellectuals can function within
the ranks of a social stratum or class in an educative or leadership role in
association with trade unions, workers’ councils, and especially political
parties.56 The professionals—such as managers, engineers, advertisers,
scholars, and journalists—are the organic intellectuals of bourgeoisie, but
clergy are not organic to either the proletariat or bourgeoisie. They are
traditional intellectuals who appear to serve universal values, but whose
careers, regardless of their class of origin, are tied to the church, which is
rooted in earlier social formations such as feudalism.57 Thus, Gramsci
shares the common Marxist view that religion is the residue of past time,
but he provides a more concrete analysis. For Gramsci, religion never
exists without conflicting with ideas that express the “protest of the
oppressed.” The example is popular religion, which is a conception of
life and the world that, on many points, conflicts with official
conceptions of the world. “Every religion . . . is in reality a multiplicity
of distinct and often contradictory religions” that vary along class lines.58
Gramsci even believed that popular religion in Italy was, at best, a source
of passive resistance.
Furthermore, Gramsci extended hegemony to include the bourgeoisie
as well as other social classes. Although one class would inevitably
become the hegemonic class, this view “presupposes that account be
taken of the interests and tendencies of the groups over which hegemony
is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be
formed.”59 In other words, the dominant class will not only exert a
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 22
Id. at 420.
Id. at 161; ANTONIO GRAMSCI, Hegemony, Relations of Force, Historical Bloc, in AN
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moral-intellectual leadership but will also go beyond its own “economiccorporate” interests in order to ally itself within a social bloc of forces (a
historical bloc) that represents a basis of compromise and consent.60 In a
sense, he supposed that the triumphant group was evolving to represent
the universal advancement of society beyond the pitfalls of capitalism.
This moral and intellectual leadership in hegemony is Gramsci’s addition
to Lenin’s views.
There are two ways a class can become hegemonic: transformation
and expansion. Transformation is how the Moderate Party of
Risorgimento won forces for unification.61 A gradual but continuous
absorption, even of antagonistic groups, resulted in a bastard hegemony,
merely passive consensus, the neutralization of the masses, and a
“passive revolution.”62 Expansive hegemony operates by means of active
consensus, the adoption of popular interests by the hegemonic class, and
the creation of “national-popular will.”63 Only a fundamental class
(which occupies one of the two poles in relations of production) can
become hegemonic, as hegemony is ethico-political and economic.
Sooner or later, the bourgeoisie comes up against limits of its hegemony
because it is an exploiting class and then uses the police, allowing the
working class to bring about expansive hegemony.64
Gramsci’s theory seems more consonant with the Marxist context in
China than Huntington’s. His theory was read, discussed, and applied to
explain and guide government policy. The party and government spoke
frequently of the cultural issues. In his report at the Sixteenth Party
Congress held in November 2002, President Jiang Zemin said that China
should
[a]ttach equal importance to both material and spiritual civilization and
run the country by combining the rule of law with the rule of virtue.
Socialist spiritual civilization is an important attribute of socialism with
Chinese characteristics. Basing ourselves on China’s realities, we must
carry forward the fine tradition of our national culture and absorb the
achievements of foreign cultures in building socialist spiritual
civilization. We should unceasingly upgrade the ideological and ethical

ANTONIO GRAMSCI READER: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1916-1935, at 189, 211 (David Forgacs ed.,
2000) [hereinafter GRAMSCI READER].
60. See GRAMSCI, supra note 50, at 161.
61. See id. at 57–59.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 130–133.
64. See GRAMSCI READER, supra note 59, at 189–221.
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standards as well as the scientific and cultural qualities of the entire
people so as to provide a strong motivation and intellectual support for
the modernization drive.65

The party and the government realized the importance of culture, and
adopted a two-hand strategy: to ally and regulate. The government keeps
tight control of ideology and censors the media and internet to block
subversive dissidents from being heard, while at the same time
compromising
with,
absorbing,
and
supporting
other

mainstream ideologies, including those of the functional religious
organizations.66
C. Religions’ Engagement in Cultural Hegemony
In order to respond to the hegemonic actions of the government, the
five major religious organizations all propagate discourses relevant to
their own doctrines in the name of serving society and promoting
people’s well-being, reflected in the slogans of these religious
organizations.67 The “humanistic Buddhism,” coined by Master Taixu in
the 1920s and elaborated by Zhao Puchu, the former president of the
Chinese Buddhist Association, has been a common public doctrine in
modern Chinese Buddhist history. The theology of love, formulated by
Bishop Ding Guangxun, the former president of the Chinese Christian
Council, is the working theological thought in China today.68
As Janice Wickeri, the editor of Bishop Ding’s collected writings
Love Never Ends, commented,
Beginning with God as Lover rather than with human beings as sinners

65. Zemin, supra note 39, at I.5.
66. Randy James, A Brief History of: Chinese Internet Censorship, TIME, Mar. 18, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1885961,00.html.
67. The slogan of Buddhism is “honor the world and benefit all sentient beings”; the slogan
of Daoism is “realize divinity through virtuous deeds”; Islam’s slogan is “pray to Allah to have great
happiness in this life and afterlife”; the slogan of Catholics and Protestants is “glorify God and
benefit human beings.” The Chinese characters for these slogans are: “庄严国土,利乐有情”；
“功德成神”； “两世吉庆”； “荣神益人”. The former president of Chinese Christian Council, Ding
Guangxun, proposed a new theory, which has a name “Love of Theology.”
68. K. H. TING, LOVE NEVER ENDS: PAPERS BY K. H. TING (Janice Wickeri, ed., 2000)
[hereinafter TING, LOVE NEVER ENDS]. Other editions of this book are also available in the United
States: K. H. TING, GOD IS LOVE: COLLECTED WRITINGS OF BISHOP K. H. TING (2004); K. H. TING,
A CHINESE CONTRIBUTION TO ECUMENICAL THEOLOGY: SELECTED WRITINGS OF BISHOP K. H.
TING (Janice & Philip Wickeri eds., 2002) [hereinafter TING, A CHINESE CONTRIBUTION].
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marks a significant point of departure for a minority Christianity
reaching out to the broader society. By making it possible to affirm the
good found outside the Christian community, this approach offers a
Christian perspective on the accommodation between Christianity and
secular society . . . [which] could be very important for the future of the
church in China, promoting Christian participation in the larger

society and unity within a church with strong fundamentalist
tendencies.69

The traditional mainstream teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism,
and Daoism all teach that human beings are born from Dao or Buddha;
hence human nature is of Dao or Buddha. In other words, human beings
are originally good or innocent. The Chinese Marxism before the
reformed era deemed that there is only human nature of classes; no
human nature can transcend the limitation of its class. Many post-Mao
Chinese scholars agree that there is a common human nature that is
universally good.70 Christian teachings that begin with original sin are
quite exotic in this context. Fundamentalist Christian views preach
extensively on the distinction between believers and nonbelievers and
narrow down the purpose of being a Christian to only salvation. These
views make it very difficult for the minority Christians to get along well
with mainstream society in China. If instead the emphasis of Christian
teachings in China was put on God’s love, they would be more
acceptable to the Chinese population.
Harmony is a fundamental concept in traditional Chinese philosophy
and a lofty social ideal that has been cherished by the Chinese people for
thousands of years. Chinese scholars had discussed concepts relating to
harmony for decades before President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao
advocated the “peaceful rise,” “harmonious society,” and “scientific
development” theories and planned to develop cultural hegemony
accordingly. President Hu and Premier Wen also extended the ideal of
harmony to international relationships.71 Chinese religions have played
69. TING, LOVE NEVER ENDS, supra note 68.
70. Huang Nansen (黄楠森), On the Universality and Class Nature of Human Right
(论人权的普遍性和阶级性),
http://www.humanrightschina.org/china/rqzt/zt20020041210
143916.htm. Professor Huang is a famous Marxist philosopher from Peking University.
71. Professor Zhang Liwen (张立文), from Renmin University, Tang Yijie (汤一介) and Xu
Kangsheng (许抗生), both from Peking University, are prominent proponents of the traditional
Chinese philosophy of harmony. Professor Zheng Bijian (郑必坚), from Party School of the CCP
Central Committee, has strong influence on the application of these theories to the hegemonic
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the role of ambassador of peace in the world for years. They participate
actively in international religious organizations and provide charity to
needy people in other countries, such as the victims of the Indonesian
tsunami. By early February 2005, religious organizations in China had
donated over tens of millions yuan to tsunami victims, including about
twelve million yuan (1.5 million US dollars) from the Buddhist
organizations, which was the largest donation that the Red Cross of
China received.72
An international Buddhist forum was hosted on April 13–17, 2006,
for the first time since Buddhism spread to China over 2,000 years ago.73
About 1,000 monks and scholars on Buddhism from more than 30
countries attended the conference in the scenic cities of Hangzhou and
nearby Zhoushan in eastern Zhejiang province. The theme of the forum
was “A Harmonious World Begins in the Mind.” Ye Xiaowen said at a
meeting with the board of the Chinese Buddhist Association in Jiangsu
province in March 2006, “The ‘harmonious world’ theory . . . will help
dispel doubts in the international community about China’s continued
development and refute the absurd China threat theory.”74 “It is desirable
for Buddhist affairs to help civilian rule.”75 The present director of
SARA commented that
[t]he relationship of religion with politics in China, has learned from

discourses. Their sample papers are on file with the author: Zhang, Carry Forward the Harmony
Culture, and Construct a Harmonious World: the Contemporary Values of Harmony Thought from
Chinese Tradition (弘扬和谐文化 构建和谐世界———中国传统和谐思想的当代价值); Tang,
A Modern Annotation of Confucian Harmony Idea (儒家”和谐”思想的现代诠释); Xu, Harmonious
Society Follows the Way of Dao (和谐社会 法道而行); Zheng, Harmonious Society, an Important
Theoretical Innovation (和谐社会，又一重大理论创新).
72. Chinese Religious Tsunami Relief Donations, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, (Feb. 7, 2005,
7:02 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/ydyhx/zgys.htm.
73. China Supports Buddhism in Building Harmonious World, CHINA RADIO
INTERNATIONAL (April 13, 2006, 12:29 AM), http://english.cri.cn/811/2006/04/13/ 198@76750.htm;
First World Buddhist Forum Opens in Hangzhou, CHINA DAILY (April 13, 2006, 10:31 AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-04/13/content_ 566998.htm.
74. China Hopes Buddhist Forum Will Counter Threat Theory, WORLD WIDE RELIGIOUS
NEWS (March 27, 2006), http://wwrn.org/articles/20968/?&place=china/taiwan&section= buddhism.
75. On February 24, 2006, Ye Xiao gave a speech at the Seventh III International Buddhist
Forum. The topic was “Make concerted efforts to have a better International Buddhist Forum.” In
this speech, he stated that the purpose of having the International Buddhist Forum was to help the
Chinese government to rule people and manage the country. He said, “It is a precious great
opportunity to come upon this excellent time, we should use Buddhism as a tool to help the
government to rule and develop this country.” For the whole speech, see
http://www.wuys.com/paper/wbf/034.asp.
A copy is
on
file
with
the author:
齐心协力办好世界佛教论坛.
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both those of the ancient China and the western countries, but differs
from them in some ways. It is a new type with its own characteristics
suited for the Chinese socialism. It takes the separation of church from
state as its base, while the harmony of church with state as its value
orientation. That is to say, to insist on the separation principle, and
form a clear border between the state and church, in case the state
replaces the church or vice versa. By doing so, we installed system
security, while do not regard separation as the ultimate end of dealing
with the relationship. On the contrary, we should realize the
harmonious relationship between the state and church, and build up
friendly interaction between them. 76

IV. RESISTANCE AND RESOLUTION
A. Domestic Resistance and Resolution
Of course, the elite coalition and cultural hegemony have
encountered resistance from both domestic and foreign sources. The
domestic ones are: (1) “the various crimes on the pretext of religion,”
among which the Islamic extremists of the Eastern Turkistan
independence movement and Lamaist Splittists of the Tibetan
independence movement are the most audible; (2) the Xiejiao or
destructive cults, among which Falun Gong is the most visible;77 (3) the
dysfunctional religious groups, which neither violate the regulations and
laws nor join the coalition and hegemony, being commonly called
“underground churches” in Catholicism and “family gatherings” in
Protestantism;78 and (4) the peripheral religious elements, including folk
religious practices and some newly imported religions both for expatriate
and local believers, which fall beyond the current official definition of
religion.79 The last category exists as a resistance not because they act
against the government or are not happy to register; on the contrary, they
are pushing to get legal status. Furthermore, there are longstanding
disagreements on their recognition and treatment with anxiety over
whether a Pandora’s box may be opened if they are recognized. The

76. Wang Lian, The Current Relationship Between the Chinese Government and Religious
Groups, STUDY TIMES, Nov. 23, 2009.
77. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2004: CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG, AND
MACAU), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35396.htm.
78. The Chinese government does not call them “family churches.”
79. See Preeti Bhattacharji, Religion in China, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (May 16,
2008), http://www.cfr.org/china/religion-china/p16272.
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greatest
fear is that any religious group could then claim the benefits of official
recognition and the current policy would fail to continue.
The government resolves each of these issues in various ways. It
punishes crimes and Xiejiao (destructive cults) “relentlessly according to
the law.”80 As to the noncooperative religious groups, there is a gray
area. It is complicated because there are various motivations for some
religious groups not being willing to join recognized organizations or
register with the government: some group leaders are skeptical of the
policy of religious freedom because of the experiences with the Cultural
Revolution,81 some have a difficult relationship with the leaders of
recognized religious organizations,82 and some have their theological
reasons. For example, a group may be very spiritual and reject
registration as profane, especially with a government that has an atheist
ideology.83 The government once was very alert to these groups, but
time has proven that they do not pose serious dangers to the social
order.84 Thus, the government neither supports nor tries to disperse them
as long as they do not challenge the law and order (for example, by
igniting massive riots). However, these groups naturally have to pay
some price for their disobedience. One example is that such groups are
denied legal person status, which is necessary for benefits such as real
estate ownership and tax exemption.85
There are widespread folk religious practices in China, including
ancestor worship, worship of local deities, Feng Shui, fortune telling, and
other community traditions.86 The official policy is to treat these
practices as “contradictions within the people.”87 In most cases, publicity
80. “To punish relentlessly according to law” (依法严惩) is an often-heard newspeak of the
Chinese government. See generally Kristin Kupfer, Christian-Inspired Groups in the People’s
Republic of China After 1978: Reaction of State and Party Authorities, 51 SOCIAL COMPASS 273,
274–76 (2004).
81. See Bhattacharji, supra note 79.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Feng Shui Booms in China, BBC NEWS (Mar. 8, 2001, 5:31 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1207420.stm.
87. This phrase comes from an influential speech by Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong, Chairman of
the Communist Party of China, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,
Address before the Eleventh Session (Enlarged) of the Supreme State Conference (Feb. 27, 1957), in
PEOPLE’S
DAILY,
June
19,
1957,
available
at
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campaigns are used to convince individuals of the error of their ways.88
In a few cases, where practices are deemed to “bring about damages to
the property or health of the people,” or to “endanger the national
security or social order,” the Criminal Code is applied. Thanks to the
untiring defense of some liberal scholars, the situation is relaxing. In
2002, the Beijing municipal government announced its latest revision of
religious regulations and dropped the clause about banned “superstitious
activities.”89 At the National Religious Work Conference held in January
2004, the government decided to set up a new unit within SARA to deal
with folk religions.90 This is a sign that the government is conceding the
existence of this cultural heritage under the mantle of religious affairs.
B. Foreign Resistance and Resolution
The outside challenges come from (1) “the foreign hostile forces”
who do not like Marxism and the Chinese system of governance and
hence try to undermine them through the channel of religion; (2) some
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-/mswv5_58.htm.
Mao
divided contradictions among the people into two categories: contradictions within the people, or
domestic social unrest, and those between the enemy and ourselves. The former is compromising
and can be addressed with peaceful methods but the latter is uncompromising and only can be
resolved with violent methods.
88. BBC NEWS, supra note 86.
89. The Chinese constitution states:
Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state
organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to
believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do
not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may
make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of
citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and
religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.
XIANFA art. 36 (1982) (China) (The Chinese characters of this article are: 第三十六条
中华人民共和国公民有宗教信仰自由。任何国家机关、社会团体和个人不得强制公民信仰宗
教或者不信仰宗教，不得歧视信仰宗教的公民和不信仰宗教的公民。国家保护正常的宗教活
动。任何人不得利用宗教进行破坏社会秩序、损害公民身体健康、妨碍国家教育制度的活动
。宗教团体和宗教事务不受外国势力的支配。).
90. DECREE ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS OF BEIJING MUNICIPALITY (北京市宗教事务条例),
available at http://www.bjethnic.gov.cn/zcfg/PolicyDetail.asp?id= 5289&pos=45. It was years later
that Chinese media noticed that SARA had set up a new department dealing with folk religion and
religions other than the five major ones—Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism.
See State Bureau of Religious Affairs Special Institutions to Manage the New Civil Religion, FUN
WITH HI (Aug. 3, 2007, 10:18 AM), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4dd11cfa01000ays.html; cf.
Richard Madsen, The Upsurge of Religion in China, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 58, 61 (2010) (“Yet SARA
has no jurisdiction over any form of religion that has not received official recognition . . . . [F]olk
religions are . . . defined . . . as ‘feudal superstition’ . . . . [And] none of these activities are under the
purview of SARA.”).
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foreign religious groups who are “trying to restore their lost dominance
over Chinese churches;”91 and (3) Western governments (especially the
government of the United States) and human right organizations, who
always keep an eye on Chinese religious freedom and try to censure or
even sanction the Chinese government.
According to Decree 144 of the State Council and its supplement
concerning the religious life of foreigners in China,92 foreigners are free
to join church services but are not allowed to establish religious
organizations in China. In some metropolitan cities, like Beijing,
Shanghai, and Guangzhou, which have significant foreign populations,
there are registered “temporary venues” for religious services that the
foreign congregations rent. For example, there are two temporary venues
for the Protestant congregations of foreigners: one is in the Twenty-First
Century Hotel in Chaoyang District and the other is in the concert hall of
the National Library in Haidian District. Both of them are located in a
central place where the foreign population is dense and can hold more
than 2,000 people. The Mormon Church also has temporary venues in
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.93
The government also is refining its policy in hopes that religion can
cushion the transformations while China enters the WTO and other
international organizations. The government admits that globalization
may trigger new waves of foreign religious influence. The religious
organizations are encouraged to cultivate positive relationships with their
friendly foreign counterparts while filtering unwanted foreign impacts.
As
Ye
Xiaowen
stressed,
Chinese
churches
must step up their anti-infiltration efforts to block hostile foreign groups
from establishing footholds in China.94

91. See Madsen, supra note 90, at 68–70 (discussing the problems of both Catholicism and
Islam, and China’s attempt to keep both from gaining too much influence).
92. The two national regulations on foreigners’ religious activities in China are Decree 144
of State Council: Regulations on the Management of Religious Activities of Foreigners in China
(promulgated
by
the
State
Council,
January
31,
1994),
available
at
http://www.uibe.edu.cn/upload/up_dfs/clxsfg3.htm, and Specific Rules for Implementing the
Regulations on the Management of Religious Activities of Foreigner in China, available at
http://sara.gov.cn/GB/zcfg/gz/948ea802-0a1c-11da-9f13-93180af1bb1a.html.
93. In order to regulate the religious affairs of the foreigners in China, the State Council
issued an order, Administration of Religious Activities of Aliens within the Territory of the People’s
Republic of China in 1994, and its implementing provisions in 2000. Both have function similar to
law. The full texts are available at http://sara.gov.cn/gb/zcfg/gz/ 20100423-01-948ea802-0a1c-11da9f13-93180af1bb1a.html.
94. Ye Xiaowen gave a speech at the open ceremony of Seventh Chinese Christian Forum.
See Xiaowen, supra note 36, at 11–13.
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V. CONCLUSION

According to the official representation of the CCP, the Marxism to
which the Party holds fast is an “incessantly developing Marxism.”
Marxism has become a useful label for the group in power to legitimize
their ideology, even though most of its connotations have been replaced.
Having the largest membership among the world’s political parties at 78
million, the CCP cannot only represent one or two classes. As its revised
charter stipulates, the Party is the vanguard team of not only the Chinese
workers but also the Chinese people and other nationalities.95 No longer
limiting the class background of its members, the recruiting policy
emphasizes that target members should be “good at both talent and
virtue” (“Decai Jianbei”), and opens its door to top college students and
entrepreneurs. The Party itself is becoming an elite organization. The
upper layers of this organization attract the upper layers of religious and
many other circles to form an even larger coalition. It seems that this way
of governance has been successful so far in sustaining rapid development
and political stability.
However, how long can this style of governance sustain itself? There
are severe challenges behind the great expectations. We are not sure
how, when, and to what extent these crises can be solved. Even though I
would like to believe that the elites in power could tackle all problems to
a satisfactory degree, can we believe that they will be able to keep unity
within the coalition and make the stage open to more talented, virtuous,
and ambitious elites? In other words, how can the power of an elite
coalition keep from degenerating and coagulating in a homogenous inner
circle?
It was radical leftists within the CCP that once tried to exterminate
traditional culture so as to monopolize or “purify” the state ideology.
Nowadays it seems that the Party is turning back to traditional heritages
for cultural hegemony. Can an assertive, official ideology be humble and
honest enough to learn from traditional wisdom that is more than 5,000
years old? Can Marxism, when combined with traditional culture and
free market forces, amount to a dominant national cultural system? Only
time will tell.

95. The Chinese version of the CCP’s new charter
http://news.ewe.com.cn/show_news.php?blockid=81&articleid=9025.
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